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We analyze the quantitative improvement in performance provided by a novel quantum key distri-
bution (qkd) system that employs a correlated photon source (cps) and a photon-number resolving
detector (pnr). Our calculations suggest that given current technology, the cps/pnr implementa-
tion offers an improvement of several orders of magnitude in secure bit rate over previously described
implementations.
I. INTRODUCTION
While much progress has been made in the field of
experimental quantum key distribution (qkd) since the
first proof-of-principle in 1992 [1], the failure of the exper-
imental community to choose a well-defined scope for the
technological power of the eavesdropper has made com-
paring the competing implementations difficult. Specif-
ically, the mean number of photons per pulse is arbi-
trarily set at approximately 0.1 photons per pulse by
most groups. There are two problems with operating
the source at this power. First, since this mean value is
not determined by maximizing the appropriate figure of
merit (i.e., secure bits per pulse), each implementation
must be assumed to be operated at a sub-optimal point
in the parameter space, making it difficult to quantify
the performance advantage enjoyed by one system over
another. Second, recent work has shown that the choice
of 0.1 photons per pulse makes all existing weak coher-
ent pulse implementations insecure to an eavesdropper
armed with foreseeable, though not presently available,
technology [2].
In this paper, we combine reported experimental re-
sults in the literature with a specific scope for the eaves-
dropper and Lu¨tkenhaus’ fully secure version [3] of the
BB84 protocol [4] to determine which of three physi-
cal implementations provides the best performance for
free-space and optical fiber applications. The first two
implementations, based on weak coherent pulses (wcp)
and correlated photon sources (cps) respectively, have
been investigated elsewhere [2]; the third implemen-
tation (cps/pnr) is a new design that combines the
perfect photon-number correlation in spontaneous down
conversion [5] with photon-number resolving detectors
(pnr) [6,7] to reduce the effect of the multi-photon secu-
rity loophole. Our calculations indicate that this novel
design offers a substantial advantage over the competing
implementations, mainly because of its closer approxima-
tion to the true single-photon state.
Most reports of the performance of specific qkd sys-
tems either ignore the vulnerability of the system to
eavesdropper attack or provide special-case analyses in
which the information accessible to an eavesdropper em-
ploying a specific attack is estimated. This runs counter
to the fundamental paradigm of quantum cryptography.
While conventional public-key cryptosystems are based
on unproven propositions of theoretical computer sci-
ence and can only be used against an adversary who
has limited computational power, quantum cryptography
promises unconditional security regardless of the tech-
nological capabilities of the adversary. Thus, candidate
qkd systems should be evaluated in this context.
Our analysis places no technological limitations on the
eavesdropper (Eve) except that she attacks each pulse
individually. Although it is not yet proven, it it widely
believed that restricting Eve to individual attacks does
not prevent her from performing the optimal attack. The
essence of the argument is that Eve’s techniques for learn-
ing information about any two pulses are in no way re-
stricted by requiring her to gain information from each
separately, since the two parties (Alice and Bob) are at-
tempting to share a random bit string in which any two
bits are completely uncorrelated.
II. THE FIGURE OF MERIT: SECURE BITS PER
PULSE
The existence of classical privacy amplification algo-
rithms for distilling arbitrarily secure bits from partially
secure bits means that it is not necessary to have com-
plete security for each pulse. As long as a bound on the
information leaked to the adversary can be inferred from
measurable quantities, such as the observed error rate,
Alice and Bob can recover a perfectly secure, shared key
by a two-step procedure. They first use traditional error-
correcting methods to ensure they have the same key, and
then use the technique of generalized privacy amplifica-
tion [8] to extract a shorter secure key from a longer key.
Thus, the crucial figure of merit for qkd implementations
is the fraction of the raw bits shared by Alice and Bob
that may be kept, such that they are certain that they
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share the same key and that Eve has negligible informa-
tion about that key.
This fraction, labeled G for gain, depends on four fac-
tors: the observed error rate (ǫ), the probability that
Alice’s detector-triggered source indicates that a valid
signal was created (ps), the probability that Alice sends
a multi-photon pulse (Sm), and the probability that a
pulse sent by Alice leads to a successful detection by Bob
(pexp). The dependence of G on ǫ for the BB84 protocol
faced with the aforementioned adversary was determined
by C. Fuchs et al. in 1997 [9]; however, the more crucial
dependence of G on ps, Sm, and pexp has only recently
been determined by Lu¨tkenhaus [3]. Combining these
two analyses, we have
G(ǫ, ps, Sm, pexp)
=
1
2
pspexp
{
−R1 log2
[
1
2
+ 2ǫR1 − 2 (ǫR1)
2
]
+1.35[ǫ log2 ǫ+ (1− ǫ log2(1 − ǫ)]},
where R1 =
pexp−Sm
pexp
. It should be noted that for this
derivation of G, the most conservative approach to the
imperfections in Bob’s apparatus has been used: Eve has
complete control over all of the errors, photon losses,
background, and dark counts that occur in the optical
channel and in Bob’s detection unit. If it is assumed
that Eve cannot control the imperfections in Bob’s appa-
ratus, the fraction G increases; however, it is difficult to
prove exactly which aspects of Bob’s apparatus Eve may
or may not be able to influence. Thus, it seems prudent
to assume the worst case, as we have done here.
III. THREE QKD SOURCE DESIGNS
A complete qkd implementation consists of the phys-
ical apparatus and a protocol which specifies how the
apparatus should be operated, and which provides prob-
abilistic statements that characterize the outcome (i.e.,
with probability ǫ, Eve’s guess at the secret key will be
correct in more than half of the bits). Since BB84 is
the only protocol for which there exists an agreed-upon
method for calculatingG(ǫ, ps, Sm, pexp) in the face of our
adversary [3], we use this protocol exclusively in compar-
ing the performance of the three implementations: wcp,
cps, and cps/pnr.
The physical apparatus required for the BB84 proto-
col can be conveniently partitioned into the single-photon
source, the optical channel, and the detection unit. Sev-
eral single-photon source technologies are being consid-
ered for use in a complete qkd system. Before presenting
the results of our calculations, we summarize the quali-
tative advantages and disadvantages of the three leading
single-photon-source technologies.
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FIG. 1. Three QKD source designs. In A, a weak co-
herent pulse (wcp) from a laser source is optically attenuated
(OA) to a mean photon number much less then one (the polar-
ization rotator necessary for implementing the BB84 protocol
is not shown). Both B and C are detector-triggered sources
based on spontaneous parametric down conversion (spdc) in
which Alice only allows the pulse in the signal beam to prop-
agate to Bob if her detector indicates that one photon arrived
in the idler beam. In B the idler beam is monitored with a
standard “click”/“no click” detector. In C, the idler beam
is monitored with a photon-number resolving detector (pnr),
which can discriminate between single- and double-photon ar-
rivals. By not using the pulses that she determines contain
multiple photons, Alice significantly improves the secure bit
rate and extends the range of tolerable channel loss.
A. Weak Coherent Pulse (WCP)
The simplest and most common method of reducing
the probability of a multi-photon pulse is to attenu-
ate a weak coherent pulse (wcp) of light from a laser
(see Fig. 1A). Since a partitioned Poisson random vari-
able still exhibits Poisson statistics, Alice must adjust
the mean photon number per pulse in order to strike
a balance between two undesirable effects: the wasteful
zero-photon pulses and the insecure multi-photon pulses.
Once the pulse is created, Alice and Bob may use stan-
dard optical components to modify, launch, transmit, col-
lect and measure the polarization of the optical pulse.
Since the different sources we consider work equally well
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with the other parts of the complete qkd apparatus, we
leave these aspects of the apparatus unspecified and base
our calculations on values for optical coupling efficiency,
error probabilities, and detector performance reported in
the literature [10–12].
B. Correlated Photon Source (CPS)
In the paper that reveals the complete insecurity of
current wcp implementations [2], Brassard et al. inves-
tigate the ability of a detector-triggered source based on
spontaneous parametric down conversion (spdc) to mit-
igate the multi-photon security loophole (see Fig. 1B).
The perfect correlation in photon number in the signal
and idler beams allows Alice to run the protocol only
when her detectors on the idler beam indicate that one
photon was sent to Bob along the signal beam. While this
implementation of the correlated photon source (cps)
extends the range of permissible channel losses sev-
eral orders of magnitude from that allowed in the wcp
case [3,2], the Poisson statistics for the number of pairs
per pulse [13] combined with the inability of standard de-
tectors to distinguish single- and multi-photon detection
events lead to a persistence of the insecure multi-photon
pulses.
C. Correlated Photon Source with a
Photon-Number Resolving Detector (CPS/PNR)
To minimize the chance that Alice registers a valid
signal when more than one pair was created, we place
a photon-number resolving detector in Alice’s labora-
tory. In our calculations we use the characteristics of the
photon-number resolving detector reported in Ref. [7],
since this device is representative of the state-of-the-art.
While this detector has a finite quantum efficiency of
approximately 70%, the gain mechanism ensures that
the device can distinguish the number of photoelectron-
multiplication events with very low error (∼0.63%). The
relatively high dark count rate (∼104 counts per second)
can be effectively mitigated by limiting the detector’s ex-
posure time by nanosecond gating. By initiating a pulse
transmission only when the detector reports one photon
arriving, Alice significantly reduces the fraction of pulses
sent to Bob that contain more than one photon.
The difficulties with this approach stem from the ex-
treme conditions necessary for the pnr to provide such
high efficiency and low multiplication noise. The actively
controlled, bath-type He cryostat required for optimal
performance [7] precludes miniaturization of the source
and complicates the task of creating a qkd implemen-
tation that is reliable, durable and economically feasibly
for real-world applications. Nonetheless, our simulations
indicate that, in achieving a closer approximation to the
true single-photon source, the cps/pnr implementation
provides an option for obtaining a secure link for certain
applications in which existing implementations provide
negligible gain.
IV. EXAMPLES
We calculated the performance of the three implemen-
tations over both free space and fiber-optic channels us-
ing values for optical coupling efficiency, error probabil-
ities, and detector performance reported in the litera-
ture [10–12]. In each case the performance was deter-
mined by maximizing G over the power of the original
laser pulses that are either attenuated (wcp) or down-
converted (cps and cps/pnr) to create the pulse. It is
this crucial step that most experimental groups have ig-
nored, leading to mean photon numbers that are orders
of magnitude away from optimality and to unrealistic
claims concerning secure bit rates. While the experi-
ments have been performed at specific distances, we ex-
trapolate the predicted gain over a range of distances by
reasoning that the dependence of G on distance is domi-
nated by absorption in optical fibers and diffraction in a
free-space link.
As graphed in Figs. 2 and 3, each of the curves stops at
a specific distance along the x-axis and fails to descend
off the bottom of the plot, suggesting that there may be
valid operating points with gain beyond the end of the
curve. It should be understood that the true shape of
these curves is nearly vertical at the cut-off distance—
the plot fails to convey this steep drop-off because the
numerical sampling algorithm used by the plotting pro-
gram is not fine enough to show the curves’ continuity.
A. Free-Space QKD
1. Ground-to-Ground Link
Fig. 2A shows the relative performance of the three
implementations along the surface of the Earth under
nighttime conditions. The values of the gain at d = 1
km (i.e., wcp→ 5.6 × 10−4, cps→ 1.5 × 10−4, and
cps/pnr→ 4.2 × 10−3) represent the actual values that
could be achieved using the experimental apparatus re-
ported by Buttler et al. for signal launch, collection and
detection [12]. Thus, using a base repetition rate of 100
MHz, the cps/pnr implementation offers a 400 kbits/sec
perfectly secure channel. The rate of this channel is ap-
proximately one order of magnitude greater than that
offered by the wcp and cps implementations. The most
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FIG. 2. Free-space qkd in ground-to-ground (A) and
ground-to-satellite (B) configurations for the three
source designs of Section III. The gain G represents the
number of perfectly shared, secure bits, per pulse. Note the
difference scales in A and B. The values at 1 km in A and 300
km in B are based on the parameters for channel loss, error,
and background reported in Ref. [12]. The gain at all other
distances is calculated by assuming that the optical coupling
efficiency varies as 1
d2
as a result of beam diffraction, where
d is the distance of the transmission.
dramatic feature in Fig. 2A is the precipitous decline
of the wcp gain around 2 km. The persistence of the
cps and cps/pnr curves beyond 10 km suggest that a
detector-triggered source would be required for secure
communications in a metropolitan area or battlefield,
while the wcp would be sufficient for close proximity,
building-to-building applications.
2. Ground-to-Satellite Link
In [12], Buttler et al. provide rough estimates of the
optical coupling efficiency and background rates in a
ground-to-satellite qkd application. Using these esti-
mates, we have simulated the gain achievable with each
implementation for a range of low-Earth orbit altitudes
(see Fig. 2B). The apparent discrepancy between Fig. 2A
and Fig. 2B—both describe free-space implementations,
yet Fig. 2B shows gain far past the 20-km cutoff of
Fig. 2A—is understood by observing that all but the low-
est 2 km of the ground-to-satellite link is turbulence-free
vacuum. Our results indicate that while thewcp and cps
implementations offer no secure communication at stan-
dard low Earth orbit altitudes (∼100 km), the cps/pnr
implementation could enable the exchange of approxi-
mately 103 secret bits for each nighttime exchange (as-
suming a 10-MHz repetition rate, a 300-km orbit, and a
several-minute line-of-sight exposure between the ground
station and the satellite).
A complicating factor in these estimates is that the
satellite altitude determines the velocity necessary to re-
main in orbit. While a very low orbit would allow in-
creased gain, the amount of time that the satellite spends
in sight of the ground station would be reduced, decreas-
ing the total number of secret bits shared in one pass.
It seems reasonable to delay a determination of the op-
timal satellite altitude until the exact characteristics of
each element in the proposed communication system are
established.
B. Optical Fiber QKD
Figure 3 confirms the conclusion of Refs. [2,3]: the
detector-triggered source offers gain far beyond the ∼10
km cutoff distance of the wcp implementation through
optical fiber. Unlike these papers which focused en-
tirely on “click”/“no click” detectors in Alice’s source,
our results indicate the considerable increase in gain of-
fered by photon-number resolving detectors. Comparing
Fig. 3 to Fig. 2A, it is clear that fiber-based qkd of-
fers performance superior to that of free-space qkd, and
is the obvious choice for long-distance ground-to-ground
applications, as a result of its immunity from diffrac-
tion, background light, cloud cover, and temperature-
dependent turbulence. However, given current technol-
ogy, ground-to-satellite free-space qkd with a cps/pnr
source appears to be the preferred option for implement-
ing a global, secure network.
V. DISCUSSION
We have calculated the performance currently attain-
able with qkd systems through free-space and optical
fibers, for three different source designs, in the face of an
unrestricted adversary who attacks each pulse individu-
ally. Our results indicate that the implementation based
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FIG. 3. Gain through an optical fiber for the three
source designs of Section III. Transmission wavelength
is set at the first telecom window (1.3 µm) to achieve low
loss (0.38 dB/km) and to optimize detector performance (the
detectors used had quantum efficiency 0.11 and 10−5 dark
counts per pulse duration). Detector-triggered sources (i.e.,
cps and cps/pnr) use idler beams at 0.8 µm where detectors
have higher efficiency and lower noise. Calculations are based
on the experimental values provided in Refs. [10,11]. Note
that the scales differ from those in Fig. 2
on a correlated photon source (cps) offers the best perfor-
mance, as a result of the potentially unlimited precision
in identifying the presence of a single photon. Further-
more, while using a detector-triggered source extends the
range of a qkd system, exploiting the photon-number re-
solving capabilities of a photon-number resolving detec-
tor (pnr) to decrease the fraction of multi-photon pulses
provides a further increase of several orders of magni-
tude in G(ǫ, ps, Sm, pexp), as seen in Figs. 2 and 3. We
conclude that future progress in practical qkd will come
largely from advances in detector performance and in the
attendant improvement in the detector-triggered single-
photon source.
A summary of our calculations is as follows. Using a
base repetition rate of 100 MHz for the pump laser, the
cps/pnr implementation provides a 400-kbits/sec secure
channel over 1 km of free space, 100 bits/sec over 50 km
of optical fiber, and 100 bits/sec to a satellite in low
earth orbit. The two competing implementations pro-
vide at best only 50 kbits/sec over 1 km of free space,
1 bits/sec over 50 km of optical fiber, and cannot safely
communicate with a satellite at any rate.
More accurate estimates of the dependence of free-
space qkd performance on source characteristics and on
the communication distance d can be obtained by ap-
plying existing analyses of atmospheric effects on optical
signals [14–16].
Finally, we mention a subtle issue in quantum cryptog-
raphy that has not, to our knowledge, been analyzed: the
role of Alice’s and Bob’s prior distribution on the error
rate (ǫ) that Eve effects by her eavesdropping. In their
attempts to determine ǫ, Alice and Bob can only use the
revealed outcome of a subset of the total transmission
record to update an a priori distribution over ǫ to an
a posteriori distribution over ǫ via Bayes’ rule. While
most practical analyses choose the uniform distribution
over ǫ as the a priori distribution, Eve can obviously use
any distribution she likes to choose the value of ǫ. Thus,
it seems likely that a more sophisticated game-theoretic
analysis would be required to plug this “a priori distri-
bution loophole.”
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